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In the context of a neoclassical growth model with monopolistic competition, this
paper studies the stabilizing eﬀects of countercyclical tax policy when the income tax
rate has an additional role of ﬁnancing government budget deﬁcits. Consistent with
the conventional wisdom, countercyclical taxes generally reduce aggregate volatility,
unless the ﬁscal response to debt accumulation is weak. The presence of monopoly
power enhances these eﬀects. Even when automatic stabilizers successfully stabilize
business cycle ﬂuctuations, countercyclical taxes are welfare inferior, due to reduced
precautionary saving motives. While, if the ﬁscal response to debt is weak and
countercyclical tax policy destabilising, the increased precautionary saving motive
is not welfare enhancing as the asset accumulated is government debt rather than
capital.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The conventional wisdom states that countercyclical ﬁscal policies have stabilizing ef-
fects which help smooth out business cycle ﬂuctuations.1 Supporting evidence comes
primarily in the form of empirical estimates of various ﬁscal rules, with a focus on the
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1See, for example, Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), Cohen and Follette (2000), Taylor (2000), Jones
(2002), Auerbach (2003), Auerbach (2005), Kletzer (2005), Kim and Kim (2006).
1eﬀects of such policies on output volatility. There is also a general consensus that coun-
tercyclical ﬁscal policy is most eﬀective when it works via automatic stabilizers, which
do not require active intervention from policy makers and therefore do not suﬀer from
implementation lags. The focus of this paper is on the automatic stabilizer element
of tax policy, as captured by a progressive tax system. In a recession, the reduced
income implies lower income tax rates, which attenuate the negative eﬀects of the eco-
nomic downturn. Furthermore, the relative eﬀects of this automatic stabilizer on key
macroeconomic variables will vary with the degree of monopoly distortion present in the
economy.
Countercyclical taxes also impact on the government budget deﬁcit. During eco-
nomic downturns, tax revenues are lower, due to both lower income and lower coun-
tercyclical tax rates. Debt-ﬁnancing any such changes creates a dynamic link between
current and future policies, as some future aspect of policy must adjust to balance the
government budget in an intertemporal sense. This is important as expectations of
future policies matter for the eﬀectiveness of current policies.2 F o re x a m p l e ,h i g h e re x -
pected future tax rates have adverse eﬀects on current saving decisions. Focusing on
this intertemporal margin, Gordon and Leeper (2005) show that countercyclical policies
can be counterproductive, exacerbating and prolonging the business cycle.
This paper brings together these aspects of policy. It investigates the stabilization
role and welfare consequences of countercyclical tax policy in an environment distorted
by monopolistic competition in the product market, and where the government uses a
single instrument, the income tax rate, to achieve its countercyclical objective and to
satisfy the intertemporal government budget constraint. This dual role of ﬁscal policy is
relevant, for example, in countries belonging to a monetary union where national govern-
ments have no control over monetary policy and must rely exclusively on ﬁscal policies
to attain their goals. Also, governments generally have a wide range of objectives but a
limited (and smaller) range of instruments, so a “one instrument - multiple objectives”
policy is more likely to be the norm, rather than the exception. The government in the
model economy adopts an endogenous simple rule where, in a manner which mimics the
progressivity of the tax system, the income tax rate responds positively to contempo-
raneous output ﬂuctuations and positively to lagged changes in government liabilities.
The policy is evaluated for a range of empirically relevant parameters values.
Three main conclusions emerge. First, while it is generally true that countercycli-
cal taxes reduce the volatility of some aggregate variables like output, investment, and
consumption, others show an increase. In particular, employment variability is found
to vary non-monotonically with the income elasticity of the tax rate, increasing under
plausible parameter conﬁgurations. Also, market imperfections matter for the stabiliza-
2A selective list of articles which address this aspect includes: Bryant and Zhang (1996), Gordon and
Leeper (2005), Leeper and Yang (2006), Yang (2007).
2tion eﬀects of such policies.3 The monopolistic competition distortion tends to enhance
the stabilization eﬀects of countercyclical taxes, relative to the case of perfect compe-
tition. In the labor market, results depend on the degree of ﬁscal response to debt:
a smaller response makes employment more volatile under monopolistic competition,
while a stronger response reverses the results.
Second, considering the stabilization role of ﬁscal policy in isolation, there is a direct
welfare beneﬁt from the reduced volatility. However, when people take direct account
of the level of uncertainty when making decisions, then the reduced volatility lowers
the precautionary saving motive. Since the only asset available to households is phys-
ical capital, the lower level of precautionary savings will reduce capital accumulation
and, therefore, consumption in the long run. This second eﬀect dominates in welfare
calculations.
Third, when requiring taxes to adjust to ensure ﬁscal solvency, the strength of the
tax rate adjustment to fulﬁl this role crucially impinges on the stabilization role of
automatic stabilizers. A slow ﬁscal response to debt allows more medium-run debt
accumulation and makes changes in aggregate variables highly persistent. Furthermore,
countercyclical taxes become destabilizing. However, allowing for a stronger response
restores the stabilizing properties of countercyclical taxes.4
In contrast to the results without government debt, the precautionary savings eﬀects
of increased volatility are not necessarily welfare improving when there is a slow ﬁscal
response to debt. This is because substitution between assets leads to the accumulation
of the riskless government bond and decumulation of capital, so that the long-run level
of consumption is still lower under countercyclical taxes.
Along some dimensions, the results of this paper are broadly consistent with the
conventional wisdom, as countercyclical tax rates do tend to lower volatilities. At the
s a m et i m e ,i ti sp o i n t e do u tt h a ts o m ev a r i a b l e so fi n t e r e s t ,l i k ee m p l o y m e n t ,m a yb e -
come more volatile, especially in the presence of market distortions. The results also
highlight that precautionary saving motives, the nature of the assets into which such
savings are channelled, and the associated long-run eﬀects on consumption, are crucial
in determining the welfare implications of government policies. In the absence of pre-
cautionary savings, the stabilizing eﬀects of countercyclical policy would unambiguously
improve welfare, as Kletzer (2005) ﬁnds in an environment without capital.5 Finally,
3T h er o l eo ff r i c t i o n sa n dd i s t o r t i o n sf o rt h ee ﬀects of tax policy are also discussed by Andres and
Domenech (2006). They ﬁnd that constant distortionary capital, labor, and consumption taxes help re-
duce output volatility (relative to lump-sum taxes), when ridigities due to price stickiness and investment
adjustment costs are suﬃciently large.
4The notion that a more aggressive ﬁscal adjustment to debt dynamics is beneﬁcial is also present
in Leeper and Yang (2006). However, in the context of a New Keynesian model with optimal monetary
policy, it can be best to have a very small or mild ﬁscal feedback [Kollmann (2006), Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2006), and Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2007)]. These results are discussed in Section 4.1 below.
5The link between volatility and capital accumulation is present in Kim and Kim (2006) and Kollmann
(2006) who, for certain speciﬁcations of their models, ﬁnd that a countercyclical response of various
3the paper shows the importance of a careful consideration of debt dynamics.
The next section lays out the model, deﬁnes a symmetric equilibrium, and details
the solution method and choice of parameter values. The direct eﬀects of countercyclical
taxes are presented in section three. Section four analyzes the interaction between the
stabilizing role of taxes and their ﬁscal ﬁnancing role. The last section concludes.
2 A Model of Monopolistic Competition
The economy consists of a perfectly competitive ﬁnal goods sector, a monopolistically
competitive intermediate goods sector, households, and the government. There is one
composite good used for consumption and investment, and a continuum of diﬀerentiated
goods used as inputs in the production of the ﬁnal good.
2.1 The Private Sector
The Final Goods Sector Final goods are produced by an inﬁnite number of













where mit i st h ea m o u n to fe a c hi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o di, Nt is the measure of these goods,
  is the constant elasticity of substitution between them, and λ governs the returns to
scale. The markup, denoted by µ =  
 −1, represents the degree of monopoly power of
intermediate goods producers. Assuming constant returns to specialization, λ is set
equal to 1 − µ.
Firms take as given the prices of intermediate goods and their measure and, sub-


















The price elasticity of this demand is constant and depends negatively on the markup,












distortionary taxes to exogenous technology shocks is optimal.
4The Intermediate Goods Sector The intermediate sector consists of a contin-
uum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms indexed by i and of measure Nt.E a c hﬁrm i




it − φ, α ∈ (0,1). (4)
The production function exhibits increasing returns to scale due to the presence of
positive ﬁxed costs, φ, but has a decreasing average cost and a marginal cost independent
of scale. Total factor productivity, zt, aﬀects all ﬁrms symmetrically and follows an
exogenous stationary process, lnzt = ρz lnzt−1 + εz
t, with persistence parameter ρz ∈







Monopolistic producers take as given the capital rental rate, rt, and the real wage,
wt, as well as the amount of ﬁnal goods, Yt, and the measure of ﬁrms in the sector, Nt.
Under these conditions and given the production technology (4) and the demand for
their own good (2), ﬁrms choose factor inputs and the price level to maximize proﬁts.
Optimally, the price is set as a markup over marginal cost










α−α (1 − α)
α−1
i
. The choices of capital and labor inputs are such that their
marginal products exceed rental prices by the same constant markup µ. (See Appendix
A for more details.)
Focusing on a symmetric equilibrium, the ﬁrm speciﬁc capital, employment, and
output can be expressed in terms of aggregate variables: kit−1 = kt−1 =
Kt−1
Nt , hit =
ht = Ht
Nt,a n dmt = ztKα
t−1H1−α
t /Nt − φ,w h e r eKt−1 and Ht are the aggregate levels
of capital and employment. Prices are the same across ﬁrms and equal to unity, by the
zero-proﬁt condition of ﬁnal goods producers. Aggregate ﬁnal goods production can
then be expressed as
Yt = Ntmt = Ft − φNt
where Ft ≡ ztKα
t−1H1−α
t denotes aggregate output inclusive of ﬁxed costs. Aggregate





Ft − φNt, are rebated to households
in lump-sum fashion. Monopoly power has a positive eﬀect on proﬁts but ﬁxed costs a
negative one. Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1995), the measure of ﬁrms is ﬁxed
at the value needed to ensure proﬁts in the deterministic steady state are zero.6
Households The representative household chooses consumption, Ct, capital, Kt,
hours worked, Ht, and one-period risk-free government bonds, Bt, to maximize expected
6The other extreme is the assumption of free entry/exit in the intermediate goods sector. In that case,
each ﬁrm in this sector produces a constant amount, mit = φ/(µ − 1), and all variation in aggregate





βt [logCt + χlog(1 − Ht)]
subject to the budget constraint
Ct + Kt + Bt ≤ (1 − τt)(rtKt−1 + wtHt + Ntπt)+( 1− δ)Kt−1 + Rt−1Bt−1.
Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on information available at time t, β is
the discount factor (0 <β<1), and χ is the relative weight on leisure in the utility. At
the beginning of every period, households rent capital and labor to intermediate goods
producing ﬁrms. At the end of each period, they receive capital rental payments, rtKt−1,
wages, wtHt, and dividends, Ntπt, all of which are being taxed by the government
at a single income tax rate, τt. Also included in household income are the value of
undepreciated capital and payments on government debt. δ is the capital depreciation
rate (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1) and Rt is the gross real interest rate on one-period government bonds.
The ﬁrst order condition for labor and the Euler equations for consumption and
bonds, together with the two transversality conditions for capital and bonds, characterize
the households’ optimal choices. (See Appendix A for the detailed expressions.)
2.2 The Government
The government consumes an exogenous amount of ﬁnal goods. They are ﬁnanced by
distortionary taxation and by issuing government debt. The period government budget
constraint is
Gt = τtYt + Bt − Rt−1Bt−1 (5)
where Gt represents government consumption, τtYt distortionary tax revenues, Bt the
amount of newly issued government debt, and Rt−1Bt−1 the level of outstanding govern-
ment liabilities. Government consumption follows a stationary AR(1) process, lnGt =
(1 − ρG)lnG + ρG lnGt−1 + εG








T h ei n c o m et a xr a t eτt responds to contemporaneous output ﬂuctuations and to
lagged changes in the level of government indebtedness as follows
lnτt = d + θlnYt + γ lnBt−1,θ ≥ 0,γ > 0, (6)
where d is a constant term.
The dependence of the tax rate on output reﬂects the stabilization aspect of tax
policy which occurs automatically, without intervention from policy makers. A positive
θ indicates a countercyclical tax policy, an automatic response of the tax rate, which
declines during recessions and increases during booms. In a broad way, this policy mim-
ics the progressivity of the tax system. Fiscal ﬁnancing is tax policy’s other component.
6When the government issues debt to balance the budget, it must adjust future policies
to service debt obligations and achieve intertemporal budget balance. The response of
taxes to the level of government indebtedness must be such that the policy is sustain-
able. Only a certain range of values of γ ensures that debt does not grow faster than
the real interest rate, so that the transversality condition for debt holds. A minimal
response of future taxes to current debt levels is required for equilibrium.
An implicit, and plausible, assumption is that government cannot implement subsi-
dies to remove the distortion arising from imperfect competition.
2.3 Equilibrium
The dynamics of the economy are characterized by the ﬁrst order conditions of house-
holds and ﬁrms, government policies, the government budget constraint, the aggregate
resource constraint, and the exogenous processes. A symmetric equilibrium can be de-
ﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 1 A symmetric equilibrium is an allocation sequence {Ct,Ht,K t}∞
t=0,ap r i c e
sequence {Pt,w t,r t,R t}∞
t=0, a sequence of government policy variables {Gt,τt,B t}∞
t=0,
and initial conditions {K−1,B −1,z 0} such that:
(i) given prices, government policies, and initial conditions, the allocation sequence
solves the households’ utility maximization problem and the ﬁnal goods producers’ proﬁt
maximization problem,
(ii) given factor prices, government policies, and initial conditions, the allocation
sequence and the price sequence {Pt}∞
t=0 solve the proﬁt maximization problem of inter-
mediate goods producing ﬁrms,
(iii) ﬁscal policy variables follow the speciﬁed processes and the government budget
constraint is satisﬁed at all times, and
(iv) all markets clear.
2.4 The Solution
In the absence of a closed form solution, the equilibrium conditions are approximated
around the deterministic steady state. To compute welfare, a second-order accurate
solution of the model was employed, using the algorithm in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004).
2.5 Model Calibration
The model is calibrated to a quarterly frequency and follows the usual parameterization
in the literature.7 Table 1 gives some of the assumed and implied parameter values. The
7See, for example, Braun (1994), Jones (2002), Yang (2005), Leeper and Yang (2006), and Trabandt
and Uhlig (2006).
7relative weight on leisure, χ, is such that the proportion of time spent working averages
20%. The capital depreciation rate δ matches the average investment-output ratio of
0.17 in the U.S. data (1947:1-2005:4). With a markup value µ of 1.4, the degree of
monopolistic competition is moderate, in the context of a range 1.1 to 2.4 identiﬁed in
the literature and, furthermore, consistent with values most commonly encountered in
real models. Under monopolistic competition, the standard deviation of the technology
shock is re-scaled, to allow for accurate comparisons across economies with diﬀerent
degrees of market power.8
The elasticity of the tax rate with respect to output, θ, is allowed to vary in the
[0,2] range. This parameter represents the magnitude of the endogenous response of the
income tax rate to output ﬂuctuations, i.e. how countercyclical tax policy is. The speciﬁc
range reﬂects available evidence: Blanchard and Perotti (2002) rely on institutional
information to estimate the quarterly elasticity of tax revenues with respect to output
and obtain an average over the post-war period of 2.08,w i t hs p e c i ﬁc values ranging
from 1.58 in 1947:Q1 to 1.63 in 1960:Q1 to 2.92 in 1997:Q4. This implies an average
value of θ, the elasticity of tax rates to output, of approximately 1 with plausible values
of almost 2. Using the TAXSIM model of tax returns, Auerbach and Feenberg (2000)
provide annual evidence on the change in the income tax rate for a one percent change
in income. This implies an approximate value of θ between 0.32 and 0.92. Cohen and
Follette (2000) give similar estimates.
In the presence of government debt, the steady state debt-output ratio corresponds
to an annual average ratio of privately held federal debt to GDP of 0.44 [1947-2005,
Table 78, Economic Report of the President (2006)]. Consistent with this value and a
government spending-output ratio of 0.2 is an income tax rate τ of 0.22.9 The parameter
γ, measuring the response of future taxes to the level of government debt, is set so as
to ensure the sustainability of the ﬁscal policy. For all values considered, a unique
equilibrium exists. With only one period adjustment lag, plausible values of γ must be
on the lower side of the identiﬁed range. For illustration purposes, γ =0 .25 is chosen
as a “low” value and 0.75 as “high” value.10
8The presence of market power and increasing returns to scale leads to Solow residuals that tend to
overestimate the true technology factor. See Hornstein (1993), Rotemberg and Woodford (1995), and
Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1993) for detailed discussion.
9This value of the average marginal income tax rate lies in the range of estimates in the literature.
Akhand and Liu (2002) give a rate of approximately 0.2, while Braun (1994) and Auerbach and Feenberg
(2000) report a value of 0.25.
10The simulations conducted below suggest that this parameter range is consistent with the diﬀering
speeds of ﬁscal adjustment found in the empirical work of Chung and Leeper (2007).
82.6 Monopolistic Competition
Monopolistic competition diﬀers from perfect competition because ﬁrms set prices above
marginal costs and make proﬁts on the margin.11 Any increase in output exceeds the
corresponding increase in real labor costs. In comparison to perfect competition, this
translates into larger percent changes in output for any given change in employment. The
presence of monopoly power changes the relative weight of the income and substitution
eﬀects that arise from shocks to the economy: changes in employment tend to be lower,
while variations in output, consumption, and investment are larger. In combination with
the dynamics induced by the government’s tax policy, this aspect will prove important
for the stabilization properties of countercyclical taxes.
3 The Stabilizing Role of Countercyclical Taxes
To better assess the direct eﬀect of countercyclical taxes, it is assumed, initially, that
bonds are in zero net supply and that the government relies exclusively on lump-sum
taxes to balance its budget every period and intertemporally.12 Lump-sum taxes replace
government debt in the budget constraints of the government and households, and the
tax policy rule becomes:
lnτt = d + θlnYt,θ ≥ 0. (7)
3.1 An Accounting of Shocks
Two types of shocks hit the economy and their characteristics are important in assessing
the stabilization role of countercyclical taxes.
A Positive Government Spending Shock Exogenous and persistent increases
in government spending reduce the present value of privately available after-tax income.
This leads to an increase in the labor supply and higher equilibrium employment and
output, but crowds out private consumption and investment. In the presence of market
p o w e r ,t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀects of an increase in government spending are, however, more
modest: a consequence of the fact that the change in output derived from an increase
in employment exceeds the change in labor costs. Figure 1 presents the responses of
consumption, hours worked, investment, and output under the two environments.
When taxes are countercyclical, the increased output leads to a contemporaneous
increase in the income tax rate, which has adverse eﬀects on all aggregate variables. The
positive response of employment is reduced and so is the increase in output. Persistence
of the shock creates expectations of higher future tax rates and lower expected after-
tax rates of return on capital. Investment thus declines even further (relative to the
11See Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), Rotemberg and Woodford (1995), and Benassy (2002) for
detailed expositions on monopolistic competition.
12In section 4, the ﬁscal ﬁnancing role of taxation is considered alongside its stabilization role.
9case of acyclical tax rates) and capital accumulation is adversely aﬀected. While in a
perfectly competitive economy the change in taxes has virtually no contemporaneous
eﬀect on consumption, this eﬀect is more substantial under monopolistic competition.
The diﬀerence is mainly because, given the exogenous shock, monopolistic competition
gives rise to a larger percent change in output and tax rates than perfect competition.
Overall, when faced with government spending shocks, countercyclical taxes help
reduce the magnitude of changes in hours worked and output, but amplify the responses
of investment and consumption.
A Positive Technology Shock A persistent increase in technology raises the
demand for capital and labor. Higher wages make households substitute current work
for future leisure. This substitution eﬀect dominates the incentive to work less due to the
higher income and leads to overall higher equilibrium employment, output, investment,
and consumption.
These eﬀects are, however, altered when tax rates become countercyclical which
means that they increase when output is above its long run level (Figure 2). Such a
p o l i c yr e d u c e st h ep o s i t i v ei n c o m ee ﬀect via higher tax payments; it also lowers after-tax
real wages and capital rental rates. The substitution eﬀect dominates and reduces the
overall increase in employment or it can even cause hours worked to decline. As before,
the persistence of the tax rate induces expectations of lower after-tax rates of return on
capital and deters investment. Output, consumption, and investment increase less than
if taxes were not countercyclical. Again, the eﬀects on consumption are stronger in the
presence of market power.
Employment and Technology Shocks T h er e s p o n s eo fe m p l o y m e n tt oc h a n g e s
in technology deserves further attention. In response to a positive technology shock,
hours worked can decline when taxes are countercyclical. This can occur under both
perfect and monopolistic competition. The main factors inﬂuencing the results are the
degree of monopoly power, the progressivity of the tax system, and the persistence of
the technology shock. All three contribute to a reduced employment response. Market
power (larger value of the markup µ)e n h a n c e st h ep o s i t i v ei n c o m ee ﬀect, diminishing
the supply of labor. The progressivity of the tax system aﬀects the magnitude of changes
in the tax rate and the after-tax wage rate, thus accentuating the substitution eﬀect,
which again reduces employment. Finally, the more persistent the shock, the lower the
incentive of households to supply labor.
Conditional on the persistence of technology shocks and the amount of market power,
one can ﬁnd a value of the countercyclical parameter, θ,f o rw h i c he m p l o y m e n ts h o w s
virtually no contemporaneous response to changes in productivity. Under the current
calibration, θ is approximately 1.81 under perfect competition and 0.74 under monopolis-
tic competition — plausible values of θ according to the range identiﬁed in the literature.
10Figure 3 provides an illustration of the monopolistically competitive case. For values
of θ greater than θ employment decreases when a persistent positive technology shock
occurs. More important, the higher is θ, for θ>θ, the larger the decline in hours
worked, which represents a destabilizing eﬀect of countercyclical taxes. For less persis-
tent technological changes, the values of θ required to obtain such eﬀects would be very
large and would exceed the plausible range [0,2].
3.2 Stabilization Eﬀects
The conventional notion of stabilization policies is that they reduce the volatility of
aggregate variables, and especially the volatility of output. But the focus on output
volatility is not necessarily well grounded. As households are primarily concerned with
the utility derived from the consumption of various quantities (including leisure), it is
the volatility of consumption and hours worked that is relevant.
In the current model, countercyclical tax policies reduce output volatility measured
as the standard deviation of ﬂuctuations around the long-run average. The result is con-
sistent with the literature. Countercyclical taxes are also found to decrease the volatility
of investment and consumption. Figure 4 shows the percent changes in aggregate volatil-
ity induced by a countercyclical tax (θ>0) relative to a non-countercyclical tax (θ =0 ) .
For θ equal to 1 for example, the volatility of these variables is reduced by about 20-
25%. Notice that, in the case of output, consumption, and investment, the relationship
between volatility and the degree of progressivity of the tax system is almost linear.
Also, countercyclical taxes have a stronger eﬀect under monopolistic competition than
under perfect competition, but diﬀerences are small.
With respect to employment however, results are a lot more sensitive to the values of
the progressivity parameter θ and the markup µ. Employment volatility under perfect
competition is a non-monotonic function of θ, decreasing for smaller responses of the tax
rate to output ﬂuctuations, and then increasing as these endogenous changes become
larger. But, for all values of θ considered, a countercyclical tax rate always reduces
the variability of hours worked. In contrast, in a monopolistically competitive world,
the stabilizing eﬀects of countercyclical taxes on employment are very small and limited
to the lower range of θ values. In fact, ﬂuctuations in hours worked increase for most
values of θ.
The dominant factors shaping the results are stabilization eﬀects associated with
changes in technology. One reason for the importance of these eﬀects is that technology
enters the production function multiplicatively: a one percent change in technology has
a larger eﬀect on output than a percent change in government spending. The other
reason is the tax policy rule. Responses of the income tax rate to exogenous shocks are
intermediated by the responses in output, which implies that actual changes of the tax
rate to these shocks depend not just on the progressivity parameter θ but on the entire
set of structural parameters. Among them, especially important is the persistence of the
11process (ρz) and its relevance for employment volatility. Less persistent technological
changes increase the incentive to work more, amplify employment ﬂuctuations, and allow
countercyclical taxes to have a stronger stabilizing eﬀect. Figure 5 shows that, under
perfect competition and relative to the benchmark value of ρz =0 .95, countercyclical
taxes reduce the volatility of employment when technology shocks are less persistent
(ρz =0 .8), while the opposite occurs when technological changes are more persistent
(ρz =0 .98). Similar results obtain under monopolistic competition, as shown in Figure
6.
3.3 Welfare Implications
This section analyzes the welfare implications of countercyclical income tax policies,
in the absence of a ﬁscal ﬁnancing role for tax policy. Although countercyclical taxes
reduce the volatility of most economic variables, they may aﬀect welfare negatively if
agents take direct account of the level of uncertainty when making decisions.
Welfare is measured as the unconditional expectation of lifetime utility based on a
second-order solution to the model.13 Use of a second-order solution is necessary because
spurious welfare results may emerge from linear models that abstract from the eﬀects
of uncertainty on optimal decisions, see Kim and Kim (2003). Let the economy with no







Alternative policy regimes are associated with countercyclical tax policies with diﬀerent
levels of responsiveness of the tax rate to output ﬂuctuations. They yield welfare Wa.
Then, the welfare beneﬁt, ξ, of countercyclical tax policy is expressed as the fraction
of the consumption process under the non-countercyclical policy (or reference) regime










βtU ((1 + ξ)Cr
t ,Hr
t ).
With logarithmic utility in both consumption and leisure, the expression for ξ in per-
centage terms is
ξ =[ e x p( ( 1− β)(Wa − Wr)) − 1] × 100. (8)
A positive ξ denotes that countercyclical taxes are welfare improving.
To obtain a measure of welfare, the momentary utility function is approximated by a
second-order Taylor expansion with respect to its arguments. This yields an expression
13This analysis compares welfare in economies with diﬀerent degrees of countercyclical taxes and it is
not a “tax reform” type of exercise. Unconditional welfare is therefore the relevant welfare measure to
use.
12in which period-t utility depends on percent deviations and squared percent deviations
of consumption and hours worked from the deterministic steady state. Note that when
utility is logarithmic in consumption, the volatility of consumption does not directly































With a second order accurate solution to the model, optimal decisions depend both
on the levels of state variables and on the amount of uncertainty in the economy. With
greater uncertainty, risk-averse agents increase their savings and accumulate more assets.
This aﬀects the long-run average of economic variables although in the short run agents
have to work more and consume less. It follows that the welfare measure includes two
components: a ﬁrst order component due to changes in the means of consumption and































The welfare beneﬁts of each component
¡
ξFirstOrder,ξSecondOrder¢
can be determined by
applying the formula in expression (8).15
Table 2 shows that welfare in a stochastic economy with countercyclical tax policies
(θ>0) is lower than when tax rates do not change with output (θ =0 ) . The second order
components reﬂect the impact that countercyclical taxes have on employment volatil-
ity: ξSecondOrder is positive under perfect competition, indicating reduced uncertainty
and higher welfare, and negative under monopolistic competition, indicating increased
volatility and lower welfare. The welfare beneﬁts of reduced volatility are expectedly
small and comparable with those obtained by Lucas (1987). Overall, uncertainty is
14Similar decompositions are used by Kollmann (2002), Bergin, Shin, and Tchakarov (2006), and Kim
and Kim (2006).
15Numerically, the welfare measures are computed using the unconditional ﬁrst and second moments
of consumption and labor, which are obtained from the solution method (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe











the utility function has been approximated by the second-order Taylor expansion. This approximation
method gives similar results if the number of simulations is suﬃciently large (e.g. S =1 0 0 ,000). Also,
when the simulated paths begin at the deterministic steady state, it is important to discard a certain
number of observations from each simulated time series to ensure that the stochastic economy is in the
neighborhood of its true mean.
13lower in the economy with countercyclical taxes. Less uncertainty has the important
eﬀect of reducing capital accumulation and long-run consumption. These mean eﬀects
of reduced uncertainty outweigh the stabilization eﬀects and make countercyclical taxes
welfare reducing. For an income elasticity of the tax rate of 1.0, the overall welfare costs
are 0.045% under perfect competition and 0.037% under monopolistic competition.
In an economy where uncertainty matters, the long-run level of the economy will
diﬀer according to the degree of uncertainty and the implied accumulation of capital.
Accordingly, the average tax level will be diﬀerent. Simulation results indicate that,
the more countercyclical the tax rate, the higher is average marginal tax. While this
is a feature of progressive tax systems, it represents a second source of lower long-run
consumption under countercyclical taxes. In welfare calculations, it strengthens the
mean eﬀect.
These results highlight the importance of the precautionary saving incentives and
the nature of the assets in which these savings are invested, in determining the welfare
implications of various government policies. In their absence, the stabilization conse-
quences of countercyclical policy improve welfare, see Kletzer (2005) for an example in
an environment without capital. When the link between volatility and capital accumu-
lation is present, then the relative size of the stabilization and mean eﬀects determines
t h eu l t i m a t ee ﬀect on welfare. Here, the mean eﬀect dominates. In contrast, Kim and
Kim (2006) ﬁnd, in the closed-economy version of their model, a stronger stabilization
component which makes countercyclical taxes welfare improving. In their model, labor,
capital, or consumption taxes respond directly to technology shocks. This modeling
aspect, while more abstract, implies no change in the average level of the tax rate, thus
dampening the mean eﬀect on welfare.16 In a New Keynesian model with optimal mon-
etary and ﬁscal policy, Kollmann (2006) reports that the optimal response of the income
tax rate to technology shocks is countercyclical only under ﬂexible prices.17
4 The Fiscal Financing Role of Taxes
In reality, governments do not have access to lump-sum taxes but rather rely on debt to
balance their budgets every period. Changes in government liabilities have implications
for future policy: some aspects of policy must change to service interest payments and
balance the budget intertemporally. The speciﬁc ﬁscal instrument that adjusts in the
future matters for the eﬀects of current policies. The assumption here is that future
tax rates do so. The income tax rate therefore has both a stabilization (countercyclical)
16There are other dimensions along which the model in Kim and Kim (2006) is diﬀerent from this
paper’s, among them: the assumed utility function, the types of exogenous shocks, the presence in their
model of capital adjustment costs. The latter are likely to moderate the eﬀects of uncertainty on capital
accumulation and the associated long-run consumption.
17The ﬁscal rule also includes a direct response to government spending shocks, as well as a contem-
poraneous feedback on debt. The optimal tax rate response to government spending shocks is always
negative.
14role and a ﬁscal ﬁnancing role, and the government follows a tax policy rule like that in
equation (6), reproduced here for convenience:
lnτt = d + θlnYt + γ lnBt−1,θ ≥ 0,γ > 0.
This setup gains in realism and allows a careful treatment of government indebtedness
and of the intertemporal government budget constraint.
The ﬁscal ﬁnancing role of taxes gives rise to complex dynamics. To understand the
mechanism at work, consider the case of no feedback from output to tax rates (θ =0 ) ,
and assume that exogenous shocks are such that output has declined contemporaneously.
As receipts from distortionary taxation fall, the government must issue new debt to
satisfy its ﬂow budget in the current period. Given the tax rule adopted, future taxes
will rise in order to service the higher government liabilities. Expected higher future
taxes reduce the expected rates of return on capital. This has the potential to lower the
incentive to save and therefore amplify the negative eﬀects on investment and worsen the
downturn. But dynamics are intricate and the degree of intertemporal ﬁscal response
to debt has important bearing on the results, as it aﬀects the dynamic path of the tax
rate and the accumulation of debt. A stronger reaction to debt (higher γ)c a u s e sa
sharper rise in tax rates but also allows for a quicker return to long-run levels: as shocks
wear out, tax revenues become suﬃcient for the government to retire debt more quickly.
While with a slow response, more debt accumulates and the tax rate remains at above-
average levels for a long time. See Figure 7 for an illustration of impulse responses to
a negative 1% technology shock under monopolistic competition. Investment decisions
depend on the entire path of expected after-tax rates of return, which are negative in
the short to medium run but become positive later on. The adverse eﬀects of higher γ
on investment appear to be relatively modest.
Note that returning debt to its long-run level is a lengthy process. Even when the
government takes more aggressive steps in reducing debt outstanding (i.e. higher γ), the
process takes a long time, in the order of 50 years. Recent work by Chung and Leeper
(2007) gives empirical support to such a speciﬁcation.
With a (more) progressive/countercyclical tax (positive θ), government relies more
heavily on debt ﬁnancing in recessions, since it suﬀers larger tax revenue losses due
to lower income and lower tax rates. This causes a strong response of future taxes,
even for small values of γ. Figure 8 shows the impulse responses to the same negative
technology shock but for varying values of θ.A“ h i g hθ/high γ” combination can mean
a sharper economic downturn but a relatively shorter-lived one, while a “high θ/low γ”
combination gives a milder but longer downturn. Countercyclical taxes initially diminish
the change in aggregate variables but amplify it in the longer term. These eﬀects appear
particularly strong in the case of consumption.
The combined eﬀects of the two roles of tax policy (captured by θ and γ) are reﬂected
15in the volatility of aggregate variables. Figure 9 shows the percent change in volatility
due to countercyclical tax rates (θ>0) relative to the case of non-countercyclical taxes,
f o rl o wa n dh i g hl e v e l so fﬁscal feedback. With a small reaction of future policies to debt
(low γ), a more progressive tax system is destabilizing, as it increases the volatility of
aggregate variables, particularly for consumption and hours worked. A more aggressive
response to debt restores the stabilization role of countercyclical taxes. For example,
when γ =0 .5, countercyclical taxes reduce the volatility of consumption, investment,
and output, and have the familiar non-linear eﬀect on the variability of hours worked.
The monopolistic competition distortion continues to enhance the stabilizing eﬀects
of countercyclical taxes on output, investment, and especially consumption (in the case
of increased volatility, market power dampens these negative eﬀects). The diﬀerence to
the case of perfect competition increases with the degree of ﬁscal response to debt. In
addition, this imperfection in the product market has interesting consequences in the
labor market: for hours worked, countercyclical taxes are more destabilizing under mo-
nopolistic competition than under perfect competition, if the response to debt dynamics
(γ) is low. However, results are reversed if this response is high: countercyclical taxes
become more stabilizing in the presence of market power.
4.1 Welfare Consequences
Simulation results indicate that private agents are worse oﬀ under countercyclical taxes,
but this is not necessarily due to the reduced levels of precautionary savings found in
the absence of debt. When the ﬁscal reaction to the level of government indebtedness
is small (low γ), countercyclical taxes increase aggregate volatility. Because of this
increase, countercyclical taxes give rise to a small welfare cost: under monopolistic
competition, this welfare cost is 0.001% if θ =1 .0 and 0.059% if θ =2 .0. [See the
top part of Table 3]. With more uncertainty in the economy, the precautionary saving
motive is much stronger. However, with a “high θ/low γ” parameter combination,
private holdings of government bonds are on average higher and so is the average tax
rate. People save more but also substitute away from capital and into the riskless asset,
the government bond. Consequently, despite an increased precautionary saving motive,
the economy experiences accumulation of government debt and decumulation of capital.
Long-run output and consumption are therefore lower, which explains the large welfare
losses associated with this policy. This illustrates the importance of identifying which
type of asset households’ accumulate their precautionary savings in, before concluding
that such savings are welfare improving.
In contrast, under a strong adjustment of taxes to debt (high γ), countercyclical
taxes reduce aggregate volatility, and so have a positive direct eﬀect on welfare. This is
illustrated for γ =0 .75 in the bottom part of Table 3. As is the case without debt, the
reduced uncertainty lowers the precautionary saving motive, reducing capital accumu-
lation and causing a lower long-run level of consumption and lower overall welfare.
16In a normative sense, the results suggest that countercyclical taxes are better coupled
with a more aggressive debt management policy. Such a policy contributes to less
volatility in aggregate variables and improves welfare relative to alternative policies
where corrections to the level of government debt are slow. This is in line with ﬁndings
by Leeper and Yang (2006) who discuss the role of alternative ﬁnancing options for the
dynamic eﬀects of permanent changes in capital and labor income taxes. However, in a
ﬂexible price economy not dissimilar to the one described here, Kollmann (2006) ﬁnds
the optimal implied value of γ is about -0.012 (negative but very small, even smaller
than the “low” values considered here).18 In that environment, the monetary authority
adopts a passive monetary policy rule, which eﬀectively stabilizes the debt stock when
the ﬁscal authority does not attempt to do so. In contrast, this paper is concerned with
the trade-oﬀs existent in a situation where only ﬁscal policy has the dual role described
above and monetary policy, while not formally modeled, has a diﬀerent objective.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper examined the implications of countercyclical taxes in a neoclassical growth
model with monopolistic competition, distortionary taxation, and debt. The income
tax rate has both a countercyclical, stabilization, role and a ﬁscal ﬁnancing role of
balancing the government budget in an intertemporal sense. The countercyclical aspect
of tax policy is deﬁned by the automatic response of the average marginal income tax
rate to output ﬂuctuations, capturing the progressivity of tax systems.
Consistent with the conventional wisdom, countercyclical taxes tend to reduce the
variability of most, but not all, aggregate variables. Notably, employment volatility
depends non-linearly on the degree of progressivity of the tax system and may increase
especially in the presence of the market power distortion.
The welfare consequences of countercyclical tax rates are negative when the amount
of uncertainty in the economy aﬀects decisions directly. The reduced volatility lowers the
precautionary saving motive and capital accumulation, thus leading to lower long-run
consumption levels. These negative mean eﬀects outweigh the stabilization gains.
Finally, the ﬁscal ﬁnancing role of taxes can reverse their stabilization properties.
Under a slow intertemporal adjustment to the level of government liabilities, counter-
cyclical taxes are destabilizing and welfare reducing. Precautionary saving motives are
higher due to increased uncertainty. However, substitution between assets leads to ac-
cumulation of the risk-free government bond and decumulation of capital, with the same
18Other papers which ﬁnd it desirable to stabilize debt slowly include Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006)
and Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2007), both in the context of New Keynesian economies. However, the
former paper speciﬁes a rule in terms of tax revenues and ignores the progressivity of the tax system
emphasized in the current paper, while the latter uses a linearised model, government spending as the
ﬁscal policy instrument and abstracts from capital accumulation. As a result they will not trigger the
precautionary savings eﬀects stressed in this paper.
17negative eﬀect on long-run consumption. A more aggressive debt management policy is
therefore beneﬁcial, as it restores the stabilization eﬀects of countercyclical taxes and
reduces their welfare costs.
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20AA n a l y t i c a l D e t a i l s
A.1 The Intermediate Goods Sector
The optimization problem of the monopolistically competitive ﬁrm is split into two
parts: a constrained cost minimization problem and a constrained proﬁt maximization
problem.
The ﬁrm chooses capital and labor to minimize the cost of production subject to the
available technology





it = mit + φ
Deﬁne fit ≡ mit + φ as the total output (inclusive of ﬁx e dc o s t s )t h a te a c hﬁrm i
produces. The ﬁxed costs φ are in terms of the produced good i. Use the constraint to






(1−α), and then substitute for it in the cost minimization




















The total cost function is then:
TCit ≡ C (rt,w t,m it,φ)=rtkit−1 + wthit
=
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Then, given the minimum total cost of production and the demand for its own good
(2), each ﬁrm i,∀i, chooses the price of its good Pit to maximize proﬁts:
max
Pit















Re-arranging the ﬁrst order condition obtains the characteristic relationship of a
markup of the price over marginal cost:
Pit = µMCit. (13)
The ﬁnal step is to combine equations (10), (11),a n d(13) to derive the optimal

















A.2 The Households’ Utility Maximization







U (Ct,1 − Ht) − λt
"
Ct + Kt + Bt − (1 − τt)(rtKt−1 + wtHt + Πt)
−(1 − δ)Kt−1 − Rt−1Bt−1 + Tt
#)
FOCs:
(Ct): U1(Ct,1 − Ht)=λt
(Ht): U2 (Ct,1 − Ht)=U1(Ct,1 − Ht)( 1− τt)wt
(Kt): U1(Ct,1 − Ht)=βEtU1(Ct+1,1 − Ht+1)[ ( 1− τt+1)rt+1 +1− δ]
(Bt): U1(Ct,1 − Ht)=βEtU1(Ct+1,1 − Ht+1)Rt
TVC(Kt): l i m
T→∞
βTEtU1(Ct+T,1 − Ht+T)Kt+T =0
TVC(Bt): l i m
T→∞
βTEtU1(Ct+T,1 − Ht+T)Bt+T =0
With utility given by U (C,1 − H)=l o g( C)+χlog(1 − H),t h eﬁrst derivatives are
U1 (C,1 − H)=
1
C
and U2 (C,1 − H)=χ
1
1 − H
22B Approximation of the Utility Function
To calculate the welfare associated with a given ﬁscal policy rule, the momentary utility
is approximated by a second-order Taylor expansion. First, take a second-order Taylor
expansion of U (Ct,H t) with respect to (Ct,H t) around the deterministic steady state
values C,H and express it in algebraic percent deviations:































































Then, following Woodford (2002) and Woodford (2003), approximate the algebraic










t where :ˆ xt ≡ lnxt − lnx
Finally, substitute the logarithmic changes for the algebraic percent changes and
keep only the terms of order O(1) and lower to get































































Given the functional form adopted here, the approximation reduces to:














which is equation (9) in the text. Note that, when the momentary utility is logarithmic
in consumption, the variability of consumption does not directly aﬀect lifetime utility
(the last term in the last equation only includes the squared value of percent deviations
in hours worked).
23Parameter Value Parameter Value
β 0.99 τ 0.22
χ 3.0 ρG 0.925
α 0.36 σG 0.014
φ 1.0 ρz 0.95
δ 0.015 σz
½
0.009 (µ =1 .0)
0.006 (µ =1 .4)
B/Y 0.44 · 4 θ [0,2]
G/Y 0.20 µ {1.0,1.4}
Table 1: Parameter values used in simulations







θ =1 .0 vs. θ =0 .0 -0.045 -0.054 0.009
θ =2 .0 vs. θ =0 .0 -0.081 -0.088 0.007
θ =2 .0 vs. θ =1 .0 -0.036 -0.034 -0.002
Monopolistic Competition
θ =1 .0 vs. θ =0 .0 -0.037 -0.037 ~0
θ =2 .0 vs. θ =0 .0 -0.063 -0.060 -0.003
θ =2 .0 vs. θ =1 .0 -0.026 -0.023 -0.003
Table 2: The welfare cost of countercyclical taxes in model without government debt
(values are in percentage points)






Monopolistic Competition: γ =0 .25
θ =1 .0 vs. θ =0 .0 -1.362 -1.361 -0.001
θ =2 .0 vs. θ =0 .0 -11.138 -11.086 -0.059
θ =2 .0 vs. θ =1 .0 -9.911 -9.858 -0.058
Monopolistic Competition: γ =0 .75
θ =1 .0 vs. θ =0 .0 -0.058 -0.061 0.003
θ =2 .0 vs. θ =0 .0 -0.146 -0.148 0.002
θ =2 .0 vs. θ =1 .0 -0.088 -0.087 -0.001
Table 3: The welfare cost of countercyclical taxes under both slow adjustment (gamma =
0.25) and rapid adjustment (gamma = 0.75) to debt dynamics, the case of monopolistic
competition (values are in percentage points)












































































θ  = 0.0
θ  = 1.0
Figure 1: Impulse responses to a 1% increase in government spending under perfect
competition (left column) and monopolistic competition (right column): acyclical tax
rates (θ =0 , solid lines) and countercyclical tax rates (θ =1 .0,d a s hl i n e s ) .













































































θ  = 0.0
θ  = 1.0
Figure 2: Impulse responses to a 1% increase in the technological factor under perfect
competition (left column) and monopolistic competition (right column): acyclical tax
rates (θ =0 , solid lines) and countercyclical tax rates (θ =1 .0,d a s hl i n e s ) .










Employment under monopolistic competition
years
%
θ  = 0.0
θ  = 0.74
θ  = 1.0
θ  = 1.25
Figure 3: Impulse responses of hours worked to a 1% increase in the technological
factor under monopolistic competition (µ =1 .4)f o rθ equals to 0.0 (solid line), 0.74
(diamonds), 1.0 (dash line), and 1.25 (dash-dot line).






































Figure 4: Percent changes in aggregate volatility as the tax rate becomes more coun-
tercyclical (θ>0) relative to acyclical taxes (θ =0 ): perfect competition (stars) and
monopolistic competition (circle). Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of
ﬂuctuations around the long-run average.











































































































Figure 5: Employment volatility under perfect competition when technology shocks are
less persistent, ρz =0 .8 (circles, left panel, left axis), and more persistent, ρz =0 .98
(squares, right panel, left axis), relative to the benchmark value of ρz =0 .95 (stars,
both panels, right axis).



















































































































Figure 6: Employment volatility under monopolistic competition when technology shocks
are less persistent, ρz =0 .8 (circles, left panel, left axis), and more persistent, ρz =0 .98
(squares, right panel, left axis), relative to the benchmark value of ρz =0 .95 (stars,
both panels, right axis).







































After−tax rate of return on capital
























γ  = 0.25
γ  = 0.5
γ  = 0.75
Figure 7: Impulse responses to a 1% negative technology shock under monopolistic
competition and no automatic stabilizer element of taxes (θ =0 ) , for varying degrees of
the ﬁscal response to debt: γ =0 .25 (solid lines), γ =0 .5 (dash lines), and γ =0 .75
(dash-dot lines).











































































































θ  = 0.0
θ  = 1.0
θ  = 2.0
Figure 8: Impulse responses to a 1% negative technology shock under monopolistic
competition, for low (γ =0 .25) and high (γ =0 .75) feedback on government debt and
varying degrees of the countercyclical element of taxes: θ =0 .0 (solid lines), θ =1 .0












































































































































Figure 9: Percent changes in aggregate volatility as taxes become more countercyclical
(θ>0) relative to acyclical taxes (θ =0 )for diﬀerent values of the ﬁscal feedback on
debt, γ: perfect competition (stars) and monopolistic competition (circles). Volatility
is measured as the standard deviation of ﬂuctuations around the long-run average.
31